2010年5月20日 星期四

歐盟的抉擇 Europe's Choice (1 of 2)


歐盟的抉擇  Europe's Choice
By Josef Joffe Monday, May. 17, 2010 ,TIME


上週,希臘得到價值1.1億歐元(1.46億美元)疏貸方案因而獲救。那可真是一大筆錢,但可不是個好對策。希臘的經濟,就像電影「北非諜影」中,從亨佛萊鮑嘉在卡薩布蘭加借來的錢一樣──「一文不值」。(a hill of beans:在美國,豆子是非常便宜的.這也就是說,種在小山頂上的一大片豆子最多只值一、兩分錢。北非諜影中的卡薩布蘭加,因為成為歐洲國家難民往美國的中途站,在那裏,錢反而是最不值錢的東西)  大家都在問:「歐元還能繼續存活嗎?」
Last week, Greece was rescued with a package worth €110 billion ($146 billion) — for the time being. That's a lot of money. Yet in the greater scheme of things, the Greek economy is just a "hill of beans," to borrow from Humphrey Bogart in Casablanca. The momentous question is whether the euro will survive.

記者應該只能引用其他人的話,但是請原諒我這個作者一點點的自我陶醉。我曾在1997年紐約書評發表一篇名為「歐元:無法發揮效用的引擎」。文中內以比喻陳述貨幣的危機:不同政府各自行政下,使用相同貨幣政策;就像多頭火車頭,想要使用自己的動能,牽引著同一個列車,往不同的方向跑去。除非是同一個工程師,不然車鉤會壞掉,或者,多頭火車未來將駛離鐵軌。
Journalists should only quote others, so please forgive this author for a little self-indulgence. In 1997, I wrote an essay in the New York Review of Books titled "The Euro: The Engine That Couldn't." It laid out the current crisis by way of metaphor: a common currency without a common government is like "several locomotives, each running under its own power, strung together to make up a single train. Each engine must steam ahead at the same speed in the same direction at the same time." Unless all the engineers behave as one, "the couplings will break," or the "locomotives will go off the rails."(See pictures of the global financial crisis.)

「歐元整合」,這個美好的想像 (rosy assumption) 已然成為單一貨幣政策的致命缺失。為了硬將歐元整合,歐盟也硬是「導果為因」(put last things first),在尖銳的煞車聲響起之前,竟也神奇地維持了十年之久。所有的引擎(國家) 有著完全不同的工程師 (政府),而且他們也有著完全不同的興趣、文化。
德國人遵守著嚴格的財政原則,義大利人有著不斷通膨的經濟和快要垮台的里拉貨幣。荷蘭習慣自由貿易,法國擅長運用國際干預力量。當德國的出口比例高飛上揚,南歐正在失去競爭力,為了維持高生活水準而繼續借款借貸。這些都是因為沒有一個安全的貶值措施可實施的緣故。(safety valve of devaluation)
That rosy assumption of "all together now" was the deadly flaw of the single-currency project. By plunging into the euro, Europe put last things first, and it is a miracle that it took a decade before the wheels started to screech. All those engines (states) had their own engineers (governments), and they came with different interests and cultures. The Germans obeyed strict fiscal discipline, the Italians had grown fond of inflation and a sinking lira. The Dutch liked free trade, the French preferred state intervention. While German exports soared, Europe's southerners lost competitiveness, paying for their lifestyles with ever more debt. And all of this without the safety valve of devaluation.

當然,希臘的債務不應該發生。所謂的「穩定協定」,讓歐盟中的所有國家都被限制在降低「赤字」、「債務」,這樣的困境中。不過,哎呀!糟糕的是,所有的政府當局,都有像是贏得國內大選這樣的重要事要作 (had different fish to fry)
    更糟糕的是,這樣的體制鼓勵不負責任的行為。像是希臘學他的南歐兄弟們一樣,沿用很低的利率。所以他們可以高興地走去當鋪借債度日。但現在,該是付賬單的時候了!
Of course, Greece was not supposed to happen. The so-called stability pact enjoined all members to stick to fiscal virtue — to keep deficits and debt down. Alas, the governments all had different fish to fry — like winning elections. Worse, the system encouraged irresponsibility, for suddenly profligates like Greece paid the similarly low interest rates as their northern cousins. So they happily went into hock, and now the bills have come due.(See how political delays drove up the cost of Greece's bailout.)

只有三個解決辦法:第一個,世間罪人自負後果;第二個,狀況比較好的國家繼續付錢;第三個,放任肇事份子全倒,就像2002年的阿根廷一樣貨幣暴跌。(而阿根廷這樣的國家,也是先前才將貨幣改為統一的單一貨幣制度。)
There are only three ways out: 1) the sinners mend their ways; 2) the better-off keep paying; 3) the worst offenders decouple, go into default and thence into brutal devaluation as did Argentina in 2002 — a nation that had previously chained itself to the dollar in a one-way monetary union.

隨著這個月急救方案的釋出,歐盟已經選擇了第一個 (罪人後果自負)、第二個方案 (其他國家繼續付錢)。歐盟也開始進行嚴格的財政控管,以及軟心腸的1.1億歐元緊急紓貸。當2010年5月3日股市開市,歐元完全不令人驚訝地貶值了!那些投資者們也許還記得阿根廷,阿根廷當年接受了好幾個協助貸款,但只有償還部分,那些債主最後只拿到借出的一小部份金額。
With the rescue package of this month, Europe has gone for options 1 and 2 — for the heavy hand of austerity and the soft heart of ¤110 billion in emergency loans. When the markets reopened on May 3, they were unimpressed, continuing to short the euro. The traders may have remembered Argentina. The country was given several injections of assistance only to default in the end, with creditors getting just a fraction of what they were owed.(See pictures of the violent protests in Greece.)


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